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Abstract In a companion study, Blackburn et al. (Econ Theory Bull, 2017), we have
developed a theoretical framework for studying interactions between organized crime
and corruption, with the view of examining the combined effects of these phenomena
on economic growth. The analysis therein illustrates that organized crime has a neg-
ative effect on growth, but that the magnitude of the effect may be either enhanced
or mitigated in the presence of corruption. In this paper we tackle the ambiguity pro-
duced by the coexistence of the two illicit activities with an empirical investigation
using a panel of Italian regions for the period 1983–2009. We find that organized crime
distorts growth less when it coexists with corruption and show our results to be robust
to different specifications, measures of organized crime, and estimation techniques.
Keywords Corruption · Economic growth · Italy · Organized crime
JEL Classification C23 · K49 · O43
1 Introduction
It is well-accepted that criminal organizations typically involve the collusion or direct
participation of the public sector in their illegitimate activities. In 1994, the United
Nation’s Naples Declaration officially recognized that organized crime has a “cor-
rupting influence on fundamental social, economic, and political institutions”, and
that it commonly uses “violence, intimidation and corruption to earn profit or control
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territories or markets”.1 More recently, a survey based on public perceptions of the
links between corruption and organized crime conducted by Eurobarometer (2006),
revealed that more than half of European citizens believe that most of the corruption in
their countries is related to organized crime. Even more recently, in 2015, the United
Nations have agreed on seventeen new global Sustainable Development Goals as part
of their 2030 Agenda.2 Amongst them, Goal 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institu-
tions, acknowledges the links between these two illicit phenomena and highlights the
importance of combating them jointly.
It is not difficult to understand that criminal syndicates strongly depend on, and
encourage, corruption in order to carry out their activities with reduced risk of detection
and prosecution. Such activities are likely to be more successful with the compliance
of law enforcement officers who are willing to accept bribes in return for various
favors. Due to this relationship, organized crime can foster corruption at all levels
of public office. This is evidenced in a report by Center for the Study of Democ-
racy (2010) which focuses on the links between organized crime and corruption in 27
European Member States. The report reveals that criminal organizations have strong
links and in-roads to police forces, using their influence to gain access to undisclosed
information on investigations, to guarantee endurance of operations, and to develop
and maintain monopolies in local markets. The report also emphasizes the signif-
icant relationship between organized crime and political corruption (ranging from
government ministers and other high-level politicians, to local mayors and city coun-
cilors).
The general conclusion of most observers and practitioners is that organized crime
flourishes most when the functioning of society’s public institutions is undermined
by corruption. Evidence of this can be found in several empirical studies cover-
ing various countries in different regions of the world and at different stages of
socio-economic development: examples include Mazzitelli (2007) for West Africa,
Sergi and Qerimi (2007) for South-East Europe, and Buscaglia and Van Dijk (2003)
for a more global sample of territories. Theoretical work on the issue has focused
largely on the role of corruption in influencing and compromising strategies to
combat organized crime. Becker and Stigler (1974) were the first to point out
that the payment of bribes by criminals to law enforcers can weaken the threat
of prosecution for criminal activity, suggesting that deterring such activity could
be strengthened by remunerating public enforcers sufficiently well and/or pay-
ing private enforcers according to performance. In subsequent work, Bowles and
Garoupa (1997) showed why the standard prescription of imposing the maximum
fine on criminals may not be optimal when there is complicity between the crimi-
nal and arresting officer at the expense of the police department. Chang et al. (2000)
introduce subjective psychic costs of corruption (moral shame and social stigma),
demonstrating how social norms may create conditions under which an increase in
fines for criminal activity are counter-productive. Along related lines, Kugler et al.
1 UN GA Resolution 49/159 Naples Political Declaration and Global Action against Organized Transna-
tional Crime (23/121994); UN GA Resolution 1996/27 Implementation of the Naples Political Declaration
and Global Action Plan against Organized Transnational Crime (24/07/1996).
2 For details, see https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgs.
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(2003) identify circumstances where strategic complementarities between corrup-
tion and organized crime mean that tougher sanctions on crime produce higher
rates of crime, whilst Polinsky and Shavell (2001) suggest that sanctions against
corruption, rather than sanctions against crime, are optimal in mitigating criminal
behavior.
Whilst the foregoing research has yielded valuable insights on the links between
corruption and organized crime, there is still considerable room for further investi-
gation. A particularly fertile area, which so far has gone undetected, is the extent to
which this link may have an influence on overall economic performance. An attempt
in this direction has been made by Blackburn et al. (2017) in a companion study
(henceforth BNR), who took a step beyond the partial equilibrium analysis of individ-
ual decision making towards the relatively unexplored general equilibrium analysis
of aggregate growth outcomes. In a series of overlapping generations endogenous
growth models, BNR study the interactions between organized crime and corruption,
together with the individual and combined effects of these phenomena on economic
growth. In this environment, a criminal organization co-exists with law-abiding pro-
ductive agents and potentially corrupt law enforcers. The crime syndicate obstructs the
economic activities of agents through extortion, and may pay bribes to law enforcers
in return for their compliance in this. The first finding of the analysis is that the
presence of organized crime on its own reduces economic performance by deterring
agents from engaging in growth-promoting ventures. The second finding, and the
main contribution of the study, is that this effect may be either exacerbated or mit-
igated by the coexistence of both organized crime and corruption. In other words,
the analysis gives rise to an ambiguity of the comparative static over the equilibrium
growth rate with crime as compared to the growth rate with both crime and corrup-
tion.
Prompted by the inconclusive result of BNR, in this paper we conduct a rigor-
ous econometric analysis with the aim of resolving the above ambiguity. We carry
out an investigation at the cross-regional level for Italy due to the wealth of data
on crimes ascribable to organized criminal groups, unavailable at the international
level. Importantly, the variety of data on Mafia-related crimes, available for a rather
long period, allows us to construct a multiplicity of indexes that proxy for the dif-
ferent activities that typically involve organized criminal organizations. Using growth
regression analysis for the period 1983–2009, we find strong evidence that the growth-
reducing effect of organized crime is less severe in the presence, than the absence,
of corruption. We interpret this as evidence that in the presence of criminal activity,
corruption ameliorates the negative effects of organized crime on growth. This find-
ing lends support to one of the two plausible theoretical possibilities and suggests
the joint treatment of the two illegal phenomena in the context of growth analy-
sis.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a summary
of the theoretical model developed in our companion paper. Section 3 describes the
empirical investigation and strategy, while Sect. 4 presents the data. Section 5 discusses
the main findings and Sect. 6 reports on further robustness analysis. Some concluding
remarks are given in Sect. 7.
123
276 K. C. Neanidis et al.
2 Descriptive summary of a model
In this section, we briefly describe the theoretical model developed in BNR and illus-
trate its main predictions.3 The general framework used in our theoretical analysis
describes a dynamic, endogenously-growing economy populated by heterogeneous
agents engaged in different occupations. The engine of growth is capital accumu-
lation, and the set of occupations may include both legal and illegal activities. The
former consist of the production of output and capital, together with the enforcement
of governance. The latter consist of illicit profiteering by private individuals and pub-
lic officials. The description of the model proceeds in three stages. In the first stage,
we assume an economy free from any malevolent behavior. In the second stage, we
introduce such behavior in the form of organized criminal activity, while in the third
stage we also add corruption and explore the implications of the coexistence of these
two phenomena for economic growth.
In each of the stages, we consider an overlapping generations economy in which
there is a constant population of two-period-lived agents. Each generation of agents is
divided at birth into two groups of citizens—a unit mass of households (or workers)
and a unit mass of firms (or entrepreneurs). The former are suppliers of labor when
young and consumers of output when old. The latter are (potential) producers of capital
when young, and producers and consumers of output when old. All agents are risk
neutral and all markets are competitive.
The key aspect of the model and the driver of economic growth is the mass of
entrepreneurs, who have heterogeneous effort costs. The measure of these producers
who decide to invest on a project from which capital is produced depends on their
perceived effective rate of return, which gives rise to a critical level of required effort
above which capital production is undertaken by an entrepreneur. With the key factor
in determining growth being the population of capital producers, any aspect of the
environment that influences the critical level of effort, also influences the equilibrium
growth rate of the economy. In the absence of any illicit behavior, where agents operate
under perfect markets and perfect governance, growth depends only on the return from,
and cost of, undertaking capital production. As such, growth is higher the greater is
the number of entrepreneurs who optimally choose to be producers of capital.
In the second stage, we introduce crime into the model by considering the case in
which entrepreneurs are exposed to extortion by an illicit organization, the Mafia. Like
all other agents, the Mafia behaves optimally by choosing its racketeering activities so
as to maximise its expected payoff. Implicit in the model is a system of law enforcement
designed to obstruct and prevent, detect and prosecute, criminal behavior. It is assumed
that the law enforcers act with full integrity in executing their crime prevention duties,
i.e., they are not corruptible. In this environment, the Mafia extorts a payment from each
capital producer due to a threat of personal damage. It is the payment of the extortion
that gives rise to a lower critical level of required effort, compared to the absence of
Mafia, above which an entrepreneur chooses to engage in capital production. This,
in turn, means that organized crime has the effect of deterring capital production by
3 For a formal analysis of the model, we direct the interested reader to the study.
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some entrepreneurs who would have otherwise engaged in this venture. As an outcome,
organized crime lowers the equilibrium growth rate compared to an economy without
crime since it effectively acts as a tax on the entrepreneurs’ expected returns.
In the third stage, we consider the case in which law enforcers are potentially willing
to accept bribes from the Mafia in return for turning a blind eye to the Mafia’s activi-
ties. Therefore, a criminal organization co-exists with law-abiding productive agents
and potentially corrupt law enforcers. As before, the crime syndicate impedes legiti-
mate economic activities through extortion, but now it may also bribe law enforcers.
This means that the payment of bribes acts a tax on the criminals’ expected return,
which alongside the extortion applied on entrepreneurs, creates an unfavorable busi-
ness environment. The outcome is a higher cost of investment for entrepreneurs that
reduces their number and, subsequently, economic growth. Both costs of illegal activi-
ties on the formal economy-extortion and bribes-show that growth in a badly-governed
economy is lower than growth in a well-governed economy.
The main message of the analysis is that an economy performs better when it is free
from all crime and corruption than when it is saddled with either or both these. But,
is an economy damaged by more or less if crime occurs alone than if crime co-exists
with corruption? The analysis provides no definitive answer to this question. Since
the ultimate factor in impeding growth is the Mafia’s extortion of capital producers,
the question of which type of environment suffers the most damage is effectively a
question of which type of environment suffers the most racketeering. This reduces to
a comparison between the expected extortion payment in the presence of crime alone
with the extortion payment in the presence of both crime and corruption. Intuitively,
corruption reduces the supply of crimes, but makes crimes that occur more likely to be
successful. This makes comparative statics ambiguous on the equilibrium growth rate
with organized crime versus the growth rate with both crime and corruption. Thus,
the foregoing descriptive analysis shows that the impact of organized crime may be
conditional on the presence of corruption, and the direction could go either way—
organized crime may be more or less damaging if it co-exists with corruption. It is this
ambiguity we tackle next with our empirical investigation.
3 Estimation strategy and techniques
The ambiguous prediction of the theoretical analysis in BNR leaves open the question
as to whether the combination of organized crime and corruption is more damaging to
an economy than organized crime alone. We now proceed to an empirical investigation
of the issue using regional Italian data over a 27 years history in order to shed light to
this indefinitive result.4 Ideally, one would seek to resolve the issue by first considering
an economic entity’s growth performance in the absence of both organized crime and
corruption, and then adding each of these factors in turn until both are accounted for
simultaneously. In this way, one could assess the growth effect of organized crime both
in isolation and in conjunction with corruption. In the absence of this ideal scenario
4 The use of data on Italian regions, rather than at the cross-country level, is primarily driven by the
availability of long time series and by the wealth of data and measures of organized crime.
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that has been followed in the theoretical framework, our empirical strategy involves
specifying a growth equation that controls for both organized crime and corruption,
amongst other variables. This growth equation is directly derived from the growth rate
expressions in BNR when only organized crime is present and when it coexists with
corruption [see Eqs. (15) and (22) of the model], after log-linearization around the
steady state. The major element of this growth regression equation is an interaction
term between the two illegal activities, which we use to proxy for the growth effect
of organized crime in the presence of corruption.5 It is this interaction term that
commands most of our attention: the finding of a positive (negative) coefficient on this
term would support the argument that organized crime has a less (more) severe effect
on growth when it is accompanied by corruption.6
Given the above, our empirical set-up is represented by the following regression
equation,
gi,t = α + β1OCi,t + β2Corri,t + β3(OC × Corr)i,t +
m∑
j=1
γ j X j,i t + μi + εi,t ,
(1)
where variables are indexed by both region, i , and time period, t . These variables are as
follows: g is the growth rate of per capita real GDP; OC is a measure of organized crime;
Corr is a measure of corruption; X is a set of standard control variables; μ captures
unobserved time-invariant region-specific effects; and ε denotes a time-varying error
term. The crucial component is (OC × Corr), which represents the interaction term
between organized crime and corruption.
The set of controls, X , comprises the usual explanatory variables that are included
in growth regressions (e.g., Barro 1991; Levine and Renelt 1992; Sachs and Warner
1997). These are the log of initial real GDP per capita, the ratio of investment to GDP,
the rate of inflation (as measured by the GDP deflator), and the rate of secondary school
enrolment. In addition to these baseline variables, we consider an extended group of
controls, composed of the rate of population growth, the ratio of trade to GDP, the
share of total public spending to GDP, and an indicator of financial development.
Our measure of corruption, Corr, departs from the corruption perception indices
that are used most commonly in cross-country empirical work.7 The measure that
we employ is the official number of crimes against public administration per 100,000
inhabitants reported to the police and published by the Italian National Institute of
Statistics (ISTAT). The crimes that we consider are based on Statutes no. 286 through
294, which include crimes of peculation and embezzlement. Other crimes against
5 The interaction term allows controlling for a key point in the models of BNR, the fact that the existence
of corruption creates selection on the amount of equilibrium criminal activity. Further, the use of interaction
terms as proxying for conditional effects in the economic growth process has become popular over the
years. See, for example, Ahlin and Pang (2008) and Angeles and Neanidis (2009).
6 In terms of the analysis in BNR, a positive (negative) interaction term would imply that p is large (small)
relative to β, in which case gc < gcc (gc > gcc).
7 The most popular of these indices are the Corruption Perception Index (published by Transparency
International), the International Country Risk Guide Index (published by Political Risk Services), and the
Control of Corruption Index (published by the World Bank).
123
An empirical analysis of organized crime, corruption and… 279
public administration, such as insulting a public officer (Statute 279) and neglect or
refusal of an official duty (Statute 295), are excluded. The same measure has been used
by Del Monte and Papagni (2001, 2007) in previous empirical analyses of corruption
in Italy.8 Needless to say, the measure may not give a full picture of corruption, and is
likely to underestimate such activity, since it is based only on crimes that are reported.9
Accordingly, the estimated coefficient on Corr may be viewed as representing a lower
bound on the effect of corruption.
As regards our measure of organized crime, OC , we follow the existing liter-
ature (e.g., Caruso 2008; Daniele 2009; Daniele and Marani 2010; Pinotti 2011) by
constructing different indices of such crime, based on different combinations of Mafia-
related offences, and using these alternatively throughout the analysis.10 Our preferred
measure, however, is an index (labelled OC Index 5) composed of the sum of official
data on five different types of crime that are indicative of the presence of criminal
organizations, either by definition or by inference.11 The five offences are: (i) crimi-
nal association (art. 416 Italian Penal Code), (ii) Mafia criminal association (art. 416
bis Italian Penal Code), (iii) homicides by the Mafia, (iv) extortion, and (v) bomb
attacks.12 A few comments on these are worth making.
Since 1982, the Italian judicial system has made a clear distinction between criminal
association (art. 416) and criminal association of Mafia-type groups (art. 416 bis).13
Common criminal association is defined as “the association of three or more people
who are organized in order to commit a plurality of crimes”. The characteristics of this
kind of offence are the following: (i) the stability of the agreement amongst members,
meaning the existence of an associative connection intended to be continuous through
time, even after the crimes have been committed; and (ii) the existence of a programme
of delinquency to commit an indeterminate number of crimes.14 By contrast, a criminal
8 We thank Erasmo Papagni for kindly sharing the data for the years 1961–2001. Data from 2002–2005
can be found online at the ISTAT website. For the most recent data on corruption (2006–2009), we thank
ISTAT officers for the collection and transmission of the data.
9 Moreover, as pointed out by Del Monte and Papagni (2001, 2007), the measure could also be affected
by a systematic bias due to differences among regions in reporting crimes. This does not, however, seem
to be case. By regressing the statistics on reported crimes of corruption and an index of the length of the
judicial processes, the authors do not find any large systematic differences among regions in the proportion
of reported and detected crimes to actual ones.
10 The term Mafia is used to include all the main criminal organizations that are present in the different
Italian regions, such as Cosa Nostra in Sicily, Camorra in Campania, N’drangheta in Calabria, and Sacra
Corona Unita in Puglia.
11 As pointed out by Daniele and Marani (2010) and La Spina and Lo Forte (2006), even if one cannot
always distinguish organized crime from non-organized crime, it is possible to identify some types of
offence (e.g., fraud, theft and sexual violence) as being uncharacteristic of Mafia-type groups.
12 For all crimes, we use rates per 100,000 inhabitants reported by the police to the judicial authority. These
data are available by ISTAT, Annals of Judicial Statistics.
13 Until 1982, Article 416 of the Italian Penal Code (“associazione a delinquere”) punished in the same
way all groups of three or more people involved in some type of criminal activity. This generic term could
not distinguish between small groups of bank-robbers and larger criminal networks with a powerful control
over the territory. This changed in 1982 with the introduction of the crime “associazione a delinquere di
stampo mafioso” provided by Article 416 bis (Law 646/82).
14 This definition is similar to the one given by the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
(2004) which describes organized crime as a “…structured group of three or more persons existing for a
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association is defined to be of the Mafia-type “when its members use intimidation,
awe and silence (omert à) in order to commit crimes, to acquire the control or the
management of business activities (i.e., concessions, permissions, public contracts or
other public services), to derive profit or advantages for themselves or others, to limit
the freedom of exerting the right to vote, and to find votes for themselves or others
during the electoral campaign”.15 It is necessary to include both types of criminal
associations in the definition of organized crime because often it is difficult to prove
the Mafia associations, insofar many crimes that are classified as “simple” criminal
association are actually Mafia criminal association.
The ultimate of all crimes, that one often associates with Mafia-type organizations, is
homicide. As emphasised by MacDonald (2002), all judicial-based measures of crime
are generally subject to under-reporting. This may be especially true for offences com-
mitted by criminal cartels, whose use of intimidation and violence can undermine the
process and outcome of judicial investigations, particularly in regions where the crime
syndicate wields a high degree of power and influence. At the same time, there is evi-
dence to suggest that under-reporting tends to be smaller for very serious crimes (e.g.,
Fajnzylber et al. 2002; Soares 2004), hence the inclusion of Mafia-related homicides
in the index of organized crime.
Another felony that is prominently linked with organized crime is extortion. Indeed,
this is often regarded as the most typical Mafia offence, being a primary means of
obtaining illegal income by preying on businesses. In Italy, the commonly-used term
for extortion is the pizzo, meaning the black tax that the Mafia imposes on businesses
to fund its various operations. According to the Italian shopkeepers association, Con-
fesercenti (2009), “the pizzo ensures the everyday activity of criminal organizations,
it increases its domain, it confers more prestige to the clans, and measures the rate of
silence in a given area, headquarter, or community”. This is echoed elsewhere in the
literature, and it is well-documented that almost all the Mafia families exercise their
power over a territory through the racket of extortion (see, for example, Daniele and
Marani 2010). As Confesercenti (2009) also points out, official data on racketeering
is often susceptible to the aforementioned problem of under-reporting. Nevertheless,
the staggering scale of the offence is transparent for all to see: for example, the year
2009 saw a total of 160,000 commercial activities in various Italian regions (mainly
Sicily, Campania, Puglia and Calabria) being subject to extortion, with total revenues
estimated to be near 9 billion euros.16
Footnote 14 continued
period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences
[…] in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit”.
15 The last two activities of Mafia-type organizations were introduced into the Italian penal code in 1992
as part of the measures adopted after the Capaci and Via D’Amelio’s massacres (where the judges Giovanni
Falcone and Paolo Borsellino were killed). Additionally, art. 416 bis provides for the confiscation of mafia-
owned properties.
16 More precisely, the percentage of shops subject to extortion by mafia-type organizations is as high as
80% in the cities of Catania and Palermo (Sicily), 70% in Reggio Calabria (Calabria), and 50% in Naples
(Campania) and the north of Bari and Foggia (Apulia). In the suburbs and hinterlands of these cities, the
percentages are even higher, with almost all commercial activities being subject to extortion (including
shops, restaurants, construction companies, and others). The average value of the pizzo for small businesses
in these geographic areas amount to 100–200 euros per month in Naples and 200–500 euros per month
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A further crime that is typically attributed to criminal organizations is bomb attacks.
For the most part, this form of extreme violence is used to threaten and intimidate
businessmen who resist being extorted, or politicians who refuse to collaborate. The
obvious distinguishing feature of this offence is its visibility when actually committed.
Consequently, official data on bomb attacks is much less prone to the problem of under-
reporting, and may be used as additional information on other crimes (extortion, in
particular) that are committed with the aid of such violence.17
As mentioned, the sum of the above five Mafia-related offences comprises our base-
line index of organized crime (OC Index 5). To test the robustness of our benchmark
findings, we also use a variety of other indices which include crimes of arson, serious
robberies and kidnappings. Arson is considered for the same reason as bomb attacks,
being indicative of extortionary activity (and more general intimidation) on the part
of criminal groups. Serious roberries (defined as those committed in banks and post
offices) are considered since they typically require a high degree of organization and
collaboration amongst a plurality of individuals.18 Kidnapping is considered because
of the historical record of many Mafia organizations in specializing in this offence, as
alluded to in previous studies (e.g., Ciconte 1992; Pinotti 2011).19
The general prediction of theoretical models, including BNR, is that both organized
crime and corruption distort economic growth. If so, then the coefficients β1 and
β2 in (1) would be negative and statistically significant. As indicated earlier, our
primary focus is on the growth effect of organized crime conditional on the presence
of corruption. This effect is captured by the coefficient β3, a positive (negative) value
of which would indicate that organized crime is less (more) damaging to growth in
regions where corruption is more pronounced. The low correlation between the two
key variables, which ranges from 0.09 to 0.31 depending on the measure of organized
crime, allows for sufficient variation to estimate the relationship.
Our estimation methods include OLS, region fixed effects (FE) and dynamic panel
techniques (difference-GMM and system-GMM), the latter commonly used in the
empirical growth literature. The GMM estimations are the most appropriate since
they are based on techniques that control for (i) potential endogeneity of the regres-
sors, (ii) region-specific effects, and (iii) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within
regions.20 On the other hand, a difficulty associated with these estimators relates to
Footnote 16 continued
in Palermo. More elegant shops in the city centre pay almost 500–1000 euros in Naples and 750–1000
euros in Palermo. The average monthly pizzo is even higher for supermarkets, which are forced to pay the
mafia up to 3000 euros in Naples and up to 5000 euros in Palermo. Construction sites may pay as much
as 10,000 euros per month in Palermo. Asmundo and Lisciandra (2008) have estimated that in Sicily, the
annual total revenues from extortion in 2009 were higher than 1 billion euros, which corresponds to more
than 1.3 percent of regional GDP.
17 Of course, the picture is still incomplete since the mere threat of bomb attacks may preclude the need
for them.
18 Serious robberies are also included in the OC index proposed by ISTAT.
19 According to Ciconte (1992), among 620 kidnapping cases that have been registered in Italy in the
period 1969–1989, approximately 200 can be attributed to ‘Ndrangheta and only 8, of more than 400,
billions Italian lire that have been paid for kidnapping for extortion have been intercepted.
20 An advantage of these estimators is that they avoid a full specification of the serial correlation and
heteroskedasticity properties of the error term, as well as any other distributional assumption. Further, the
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the choice of the number of lags of the endogenous and predetermined variables. In
order to restrict the number of instruments so as not to excessively exceed the number
of regions (and thus avoid over fitting of the instrumented variables), we use a lag
structure of two to four lags for difference-GMM and two to three lags for system-
GMM.21
In both the system- and difference-GMM estimations, we test the validity of the
instruments by applying two specification tests. The first is Hansen (1982) J-test of
over-identifying restrictions which we use to examine the coherency of the instruments.
The second is Arellano and Bond (1991) test for serial correlation of the disturbances up
to second order. This test is important since the presence of serial correlation can cause
a bias to both the estimated coefficients and standard errors. The appropriate check
relates only to the absence of second-order serial correlation since first-differencing
induces first-order serial correlation in the transformed errors.
The system-GMM estimator imposes an additional assumption to be satisfied
relative to the difference-GMM estimator. This assumption requires a stationarity
restriction on the initial conditions of GDP per capita. In particular, the region fixed
effects have to be orthogonal to the lagged level of growth rates. According to Bond
et al. (2001), this estimator has superior finite sample properties by combining “the
standard set of equations in first-differences with suitably lagged levels as instruments,
with an additional set of equations in levels with suitably lagged first-differences as
instruments.” Empirically, the validity of these additional instruments for the levels
equation, which are the most suspect in system-GMM, is tested using a Difference-
in-Hansen test that compares the first-differenced GMM and system-GMM results.
4 Data
We use a panel of 19 Italian regions for the period 1983–2009.22 Depending on our
measure of organized crime, the period considered in different estimations may vary
due to data availability.23 Table 7 in “Data appendix” section provides definitions,
Footnote 20 continued
system-GMM estimator is computed using the finite-sample correction to the two-step covariance matrix
derived by Windmeijer (2005) which allows for the estimation of robust standard errors.
21 We use a different lag structure for each estimator so that both estimators end up with similar number of
instruments to assist comparability. In each case we have to collapse the instrument set so that we create one
instrument for each variable and lag distance, rather than one for each time period, variable, and lag distance.
In large samples collapse reduces statistical efficiency, but in small samples it can avoid the bias that arises
as the number of instruments climbs toward the number of observations (Roodman 2006). We have also
experimented with the use of just the second lag as an instrument and the use of fewer variables as being
instrumented for (organized crime, corruption and their interaction) instead of collapsing the instruments.
In each case the number of instruments greatly exceeds the number of regions, although our findings do not
change. For this reason, we do not show these results.
22 We exclude Valle d’Aosta, since it is the smallest and richest region and is usually excluded in the
empirical analysis of Italian regions, being treated as an outlier.
23 For instance, data on homicides by the Mafia, criminal association, extortion, arson and serious robberies
are available from 1975, whilst data on Mafia criminal association and bomb attacks are available only from
1983 (after the change in the Italian Penal Code). The longest data are on the sum of extortion, kidnapping
for extortion and serious robberies, being available since 1961 from CRENOS.
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Table 1 Summary statistics
Variable Mean SD Min Max Obs
GDP p.c. growth (%) 2.63 2.56 −3.95 11.63 257
Initial GDP p.c. (1990 lire) 18,900,000 8,068,528 4,165,179 39,000,000 257
Investment (% GDP) 24.81 6.68 15.81 71.55 240
Education 62.06 25.27 11.84 104.79 260
Inflation (%) 19.77 6.98 5.9 −4.52 260
Population growth (%) 4.06 3.67 0.12 16.01 257
Public spending (% GDP) 19.46 5.53 9.62 33.52 200
Trade (% GDP) 33.95 28.08 1.22 223.44 207
Financial development (% GDP) 20.03 3.33 12.29 27.54 140
Corruption 2.35 1.98 0.19 10.2 257
OC Index 5 10.67 7.41 2.78 43.12 160
Extortion 5.29 3.55 0.89 19.03 200
Criminal association 1.85 0.96 0.44 6 200
Mafia criminal association 0.3 0.5 0 2.95 160
Homicides by Mafia 0.24 0.71 0 6.73 200
Bomb attacks 2.37 4.28 0 24 160
Arsons 13.4 12.72 2.02 101.13 200
Robberies in banks 2.34 1.68 0 7.38 160
Robberies in posts 1.16 0.96 0 6.81 160
Kidnapping for extortion 0.24 0.2 0 1.11 200
OC Index ISTAT 20.51 15.53 4 76.61 120
OC Index CRENOS 38.93 40.6 3.19 295.12 200
OC Index Daniele and Marani 25.95 18.62 7.44 124.78 160
Homicides 1.54 1.62 0.21 12.85 257
PCA OC Index 5 1.25 1.65 −1.48 8.2 160
Data on GDP per capita growth, investment, inflation, secondary school enrolment, trade, public spend-
ing, financial development and population growth are from CRENOS and the Italian National Institute of
Statistics (ISTAT), Annals of Statistics (various years). For these variables, summary statistics are based
on average data for the period 1961–2009. Data on crimes are from ISTAT, Annals of Judicial Statistics
(various years). The period of time considered for the averages depends on the availability of data (see
Table 7 in “Data Appendix” section for a detailed description of the availability of data)
sources and the exact period availability of the data, whilst Table 1 presents some
summary statistics. Following the standard approach, we construct 7 non-overlapping
4-year period averages (1983−1986, 1987−1990, . . . , 2007−2009) in order to mini-
mize business cycles effects. This implies a maximum sample size of 133 observations
when we use our baseline measure of organized crime (OC Index 5), though sometimes
we end up working with fewer observations due to missing data.24
24 When we use the measure of OC available since 1961, we construct 13 non-overlapping 4-year period
averages (1961−1964, 1965−1968, . . . , 2008−2009) with a maximum sample size of 247 observations.
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5 Baseline results
We begin our analysis by estimating Eq. (1) first with OLS and FE and then with
difference- and system-GMM to account for the potential endogeneity of all the right-
hand-side variables. The OLS and FE results are reported in Table 2, while the GMM
results appear in Table 3 (difference-GMM in Panel A and system-GMM in Panel B).
Each of the first five columns shows the results for a different measure of organized
crime. Column 1 reports the results using the simplest index of organized crime—
namely, Mafia criminal association. The subsequent columns give the results based on
indices that are constructed by adding, in turn, each of the following types of organized
crime: homicides by the Mafia, criminal association, bomb attacks, and extortion. The
index used in column 5 (OC Index 5) is the most complete measure and represents our
baseline measure of organized crime. Columns 6 and 7 also use this more complete
index, but also control for a time trend and region fixed effects, respectively.
With regard to instrumentation, when using GMM techniques, the small number
of Italian regions constrains us in keeping the maximum number of lags to four for
difference-GMM and to three for system-GMM, in order to maintain the number of
instruments at a minimum. Despite this tight restriction, in each case the instruments
appear to be valid according to Hansen (1982) specification test, whilst the Arellano
and Bond (1991) test does not reject the null hypothesis of no second-order serial corre-
lation, at any acceptable level of significance. Similarly, the Difference-in-Hansen test,
focusing on the additional instruments used by the system-GMM estimator, supports
the instrument validity.25
Both Tables 2 and 3 illustrate the typical findings of growth regressions: there is
conditional income convergence, a positive statistically significant effect of invest-
ment, and a negative statistically significant effect of inflation.26 As found elsewhere
in the empirical growth literature, both at the cross-country level (e.g., Benhabib and
Spiegel 1994) and for the case of Italy (e.g., Di Liberto 2008), the coefficient on edu-
cation is estimated to be negative. This result may be due to the specific measure of
education that we use to proxy for human capital (secondary school enrolment rates) or
due to the distorted structural composition of the Italian labor force and the inefficient
allocation of human capital across sectors.
With regard to the variables of most interest to us, our results confirm those of
previous studies, showing that the coefficients on corruption and organized crime are
negative and statistically significant in all regressions at least at the 5% level (except
25 It is due to this characteristic that the system-GMM estimator yields an improvement in precision over
its difference counterpart. For this reason, we use this estimator in our various sensitivity analysis following
below.
26 Note that income convergence takes shape only when we control for region fixed effects in the last
column of Table 2 and with the difference-GMM regression at the top panel of Table 3. Further, comparing
the coefficient estimate of initial GDP per capita across the OLS, within-regions and difference-GMM
estimators, we observe that the estimate associated with the difference-GMM estimator lies between those
of the OLS levels and the within-regions estimators, which according to Bond et al. (2001) is in line with
a consistent estimate of initial GDP per capita. In particular, had the difference-GMM estimator of initial
income lied above the corresponding within-regions estimate, there would have been concerns that the
difference-GMM estimates are biased due to weak instruments. This, however, does not appear to the case
in our regressions, lending further support to the Hansen J-test and the validity of our instruments.
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Table 3 GMM estimations
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Panel A: Difference-GMM
Initial GDP per capita (log) −7.47 −6.29 −9.18 −8.87 −8.97
(0.000) (0.031) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inflation −0.369 −0.405 −0.482 −0.361 −0.422
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education −0.038 −0.052 −0.066 −0.020 −0.033
(0.038) (0.054) (0.003) (0.223) (0.046)
Investment 0.284 0.248 0.372 0.147 0.255
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Corruption −0.297 −0.256 −0.394 −0.472 −0.635
(0.043) (0.043) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000)
Organized crime −3.082 −0.786 −0.220 −0.262 −0.140
(0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000)
Corruption*Organized crime 0.424 0.114 0.201 0.026 0.039
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Regions/Obs 19/114 19/114 19/114 19/114 19/114
Number of instruments 21 21 21 21 21
Hansen J-test (p value) 0.338 0.256 0.258 0.256 0.239
AR(1) test (p value) 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.002
AR(2) test (p value) 0.717 0.341 0.442 0.933 0.900
No. of lags of endogenous
variables used as instruments
2_4 2_4 2_4 2_4 2_4
Panel B: System-GMM
Initial GDP per capita (log) −1.60 −0.60 −1.20 −3.06 −1.73
(0.059) (0.424) (0.207) (0.001) (0.151)
Inflation −0.351 −0.386 −0.345 −0.322 −0.308
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education −0.079 −0.092 −0.080 −0.055 −0.053
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Investment 0.218 0.256 0.176 0.107 0.108
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.006) (0.007)
Corruption −0.206 −0.196 −0.749 −0.367 −0.795
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Organized crime −2.045 −0.720 −0.521 −0.160 −0.126
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Corruption*Organized crime 0.316 0.143 0.210 0.017 0.039
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.039) (0.000)
Regions/Obs 19/133 19/133 19/133 19/133 19/133
Number of instruments 22 22 22 22 22
Hansen J-test (p value) 0.272 0.279 0.491 0.324 0.348
Difference-in-Hansen J-test (p value) 0.733 0.747 0.990 0.943 0.956
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Table 3 continued
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
AR(1) test (p value) 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002
AR(2) test (p value) 0.244 0.133 0.841 0.147 0.25
No. of lags of endogenous
variables used as instruments
2_3 2_3 2_3 2_3 2_3
Dependent variable is the GDP per capita growth rate. p values in parentheses. Constant term not reported.
Regressions based on Difference-GMM (Panel A) and System-GMM (Panel B). The System-GMM esti-
mator is computed using the Windmeijer (2005) two-step procedure. All control variables are instrumented
for. The measures of OC are as described in Table 2
in the last column of Table 2 where organized crime is not statistically significant).
Interestingly, the interaction term coefficient is positive and significant, at the 1%
level in the GMM regressions. Together, these findings indicate that each type of
illegal activity has an adverse impact on growth, but that the impact of organized
crime is less severe in the presence of corruption. The general implication of this is
that the extent to which corruption occurs is an important factor in determining the
negative growth effect of organized crime. The specific implication is that the presence
of corruption tends to mitigate this effect. Our findings reflect within-region variation
and are qualitatively very strong, though there is obviously variation in the quantitative
magnitude of the coefficients depending on the particular measure of organized crime.
6 Robustness checks
In what follows we test the robustness of the baseline results under various modifica-
tions of our analysis. These include consideration of different regression specifications
and the use of alternative measures of organized crime.
6.1 Robustness to different regression specifications
As previously discussed, a difficulty associated with the dynamic GMM estimators
relates to the choice of the number of lags of the endogenous variables that are used as
instruments. So far, our system-GMM results have been obtained by using a length of
two to three lags in order to limit the number of instruments. As a robustness test, we
reduce the length of the maximum lags to two so that we only use the second lagged
value of a variable as its instrument. The results are shown in Column 2 of Table 4,
while Column 1 reproduces Column 5 of Panel B in Table 3 for comparison purposes.
Our findings remain intact and the coefficient estimates are very stable.
We further check the robustness of our baseline findings by adding more control
variables usually found in growth regressions: these include the rate of population
growth, the share of total public spending to GDP, the ratio of trade to GDP, and a
measure of financial development. The results are reported in Columns 3–6 of Table 4.
Once again, our main results remain unaltered, with some of the additional regres-
sors having the expected sign and being statistically significant (public spending and
financial development).
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Table 4 Robustness tests to additional controls and dummy interactions
Dependent variable: GDP
pc growth
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Initial GDP per capita
(log)
−1.73 −2.66 −0.65 −1.13 −2.33 −1.27 −0.96 −4.92
(0.151) (0.165) (0.686) (0.325) (0.027) (0.321) (0.503) (0.366)
Inflation −0.308 −0.333 −0.311 −0.342 −0.364 −0.115 −0.331 −0.491
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Education −0.053 −0.044 −0.039 −0.039 −0.042 −0.047 −0.053 −0.039
(0.000) (0.021) (0.055) (0.014) (0.079) (0.003) (0.008) (0.526)
Investment 0.108 0.219 0.239 0.268 0.214 −0.012 0.223 0.212
(0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.822) (0.000) (0.183)
Corruption −0.795 −0.813 −0.848 −0.851 −0.812 −0.330 −0.796 −3.433
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.032)
Organized crime −0.126 −0.102 −0.195 −0.167 −0.167 −0.148 −0.144 −0.779
(0.000) (0.018) (0.040) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.039)
Corruption*Organized
crime
0.039 0.036 0.051 0.054 0.051 0.020 0.045 0.250
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (0.054)
Population growth 0.31 0.16 0.159 0.261
(0.021) (0.169) (0.112) (0.001)
Public spending −0.163 −0.164 0.050
(0.003) (0.001) (0.326)
Trade 0.009 −0.016
(0.298) (0.061)
Financial development 0.164
(0.043)
Corr*OC*1980s 0.019
(0.437)
Corr*OC*1990s 0.000
(0.931)
Corr*OC*Campania −0.069
(0.246)
Corr*OC*Calabria −0.074
(0.213)
Corr*OC*Sicilia −0.073
(0.169)
Corruption*OC*Puglia 0.019
(0.926)
Corruption*OC*Basilicata 0.064
(0.425)
Corruption*OC*Molise −0.104
(0.210)
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Table 4 continued
Dependent variable: GDP
pc growth
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Corruption*OC*Lazio −0.255
(0.401)
Corruption*OC*Liguria 0.246
(0.191)
Regions/Obs 19/133 19/133 19/133 19/133 19/130 19/111 19/133 19/134
Number of instruments 22 15 17 19 21 23 18 31
Hansen J-test (p value) 0.348 0.072 0.079 0.074 0.103 0.666 0.077 0.778
AR(1) test (p value) 0.002 0.003 0.008 0.004 0.009 0.006 0.003 0.001
AR(2) test (p value) 0.25 0.572 0.276 0.322 0.419 0.317 0.368 0.234
No. of lags of
endogenous
variables used as
instruments
2_3 2_2 2_2 2_2 2_2 2_2 2_2 2_2
Dependent variable is the GDP per capita growth rate. p values in parentheses. Constant term not reported.
Regressions based on System-GMM. All control variables are instrumented for. OC measured by the
baseline index, OC Index 5
In some Italian regions (for instance Puglia, Basilicata, Lazio, Liguria, Molise)
organized crime is a relatively recent phenomenon. Thus, it is possible that our results
may be driven by variations in organized crime across time. In order to control for
this variability, we estimate the regression by adding interaction terms of corruption,
organized crime and decadal dummies.27 The results are reported in Column 7 of
Table 4, and they show that decadal differences in organized crime do not seem to
matter for growth. It is also possible that our findings are driven by regional differences
in organized crime experience. We account for such regional dissimilarities by adding
interaction terms of corruption, organized crime and territorial dummy variables for
regions where organized criminality is more widespread.28 The results are reported
in the last column of Table 4, and they show that our main findings are still robust.
Further, the region-specific estimates of the interaction between organized crime and
corruption are not statistically significant.
6.2 Robustness to alternative measures of organized crime
For the most part of the preceding analysis, we have used OC Index 5 as our preferred
measure of organized crime. It is important to verify that our results can be established
27 Since our baseline measure of organized crime is available for the period 1983–2009, we account for
the two decades 1980s and 1990s, excluding the 2000s so as to avoid the so-called dummy-trap.
28 As before, the regions have been classified on the base of the data on mafia-type criminal association
(art. 416 bis of the Italian Penal Code) averaged for the period 1983–2009. The regions with the highest
number of these crimes, in diminishing order, are: Sicily, Calabria, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Molise,
Lazio, and Liguria.
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using other measures that have been adopted in the literature. To this end, we construct
additional indices of organized crime by considering different combinations of Mafia-
related offences and applying them in estimations of Eq. (1). Being highly correlated,
these indices are not expected to produce results that are substantially different from
those based on our OC Index 5. Table 5 confirms this.
Column 1 replicates Column 5 of Table 3 (Panel B) for comparison. As discussed
earlier, this baseline measure is constructed as the sum of official data recorded on five
different types of crime that are defined as being proof, or deemed symptomatic, of the
presence of criminal organizations (i.e., criminal association, Mafia criminal associa-
tion, homicides by Mafia, bomb attacks, and extortion). Column 2, instead, reports the
results using an index that excludes criminal association and extortion, but which prox-
ies the latter by arson and bomb attacks as the primary means of exacting payments
from businesses (e.g., Confesercenti 2009; Daniele and Marani 2010). The subse-
quent columns take OC Index 5 and add successively arson (Column 3), kidnapping
for extortion (Column 4), and both arson and kidnapping for extortion (Column 5).
Added to the above are results based on three further measures of organized crime.
The first of these (Column 6) is the index of organized crime proposed by Daniele and
Marani (2010). This differs from our baseline index in its exclusion of homicides by the
Mafia but inclusion of arson. The second (Column 7) is the measure produced by the
Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), as used by Caruso (2008). This is based
on the definition of criminal organization given by the Italian Minister of Interiors,
and includes the crimes of homicides by the Mafia, bomb attacks, arson and serious
robberies.29 The third (Column 8) is an index constructed more broadly from data on
extortion, kidnapping for extortion and serious robberies (available from CRENOS).
This is not strictly associated with organized crime, but may be regarded as closely
proxying it for reasons given earlier, and has the appeal of covering a relatively long
time span (beginning from 1961).
As Table 5 shows, the use of alternative measures of organized crime makes little
difference to our original results. The growth effects of our three key variables—
organized crime, corruption and the interaction between these—remain statistically
significant and in the same direction (i.e., negative, negative and positive). An addi-
tional set of results presented in Column 9 of the Table relate specifically to the
interaction term. One might raise the question about whether the effect of this term is
specific to organized crime, or whether it extends to other types of crime. To address
this question, we conduct a falsification test, where organized crime is replaced by a
measure of normal crime. A natural choice of the latter is intentional homicide, given
that such crime is well-reported and given that it has a well-known distortionary effect
on growth (e.g., Cárdenas and Rozo 2008; Detotto and Otranto 2010). Our results
confirm this effect, whilst also demonstrating that its magnitude is not conditional
on the presence or absence of corruption. In other words, the interaction term is not
statistically significant. This implies that our previously robust finding of a positive
29 Rather than using directly the index given by ISTAT, we construct an index as the sum of organized crime
offences identified by this institute. We do so because of the relatively short time span of the original data,
which covers 1995–2003, 2006 and 2008–2010. By contrast, our reconstructed measure provides coverage
for 1983–2009.
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Table 6 Robustness to alternative PCA indexes of organized crime
Dependent variable:
GDP pc growth
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Index 3 Index 4 Index 5 Index 6 ISTAT Index
Initial GDP pc (log) −0.28 −0.82 −0.22 −1.67 −2.48
(0.745) (0.411) (0.805) (0.080) (0.000)
Inflation −0.35 −0.363 −0.349 −0.373 −0.255
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education −0.083 −0.086 −0.083 −0.080 −0.060
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Investment 0.188 0.215 0.188 0.197 −0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.967)
Corruption −0.225 −0.137 −0.197 −0.144 −0.279
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.079) (0.000)
Organized crime −0.609 −0.515 −0.463 −0.571 −0.765
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Corruption*Organized crime 0.268 0.138 0.174 0.105 0.112
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Regions/Obs 19/133 19/133 19/133 19/133 19/133
Number of instruments 22 22 22 22 22
Hansen J-test (p value) 0.318 0.272 0.280 0.239 0.046
AR(1) test (p value) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.004
AR(2) test (p value) 0.893 0.132 0.259 0.239 0.273
No. of lags of endogenous
variables used as instruments
2_3 2_3 2_3 2_3 2_3
Dependent variable is the GDP per capita growth rate. p values in parentheses. Constant term not reported.
Regressions based on system-GMM. All control variables are instrumented for. Index 3: PCA of Mafia
criminal association, homicides by Mafia, criminal association; Index 4: PCA of Mafia criminal association,
homicides by Mafia, criminal association, bomb attacks; Index 5: PCA of crime variables in baseline measure
OC Index 5; Index 6: PCA of Mafia criminal association, homicides by Mafia, bomb attacks, arsons; ISTAT
Index: PCA of crime variables in ISTAT Index
interaction term is likely to reflect an association between organized crime (rather than
general crime) and corruption.
To this point, our indices for organized crime have been constructed as the sum
of various Mafia-related crimes. As a final robustness check of our results, we use
measures of organized crime obtained from Principal Component Analysis (PCA).30
Table 6 reports our results using alternative measures of organized crime based on the
PCA procedure. Column 1 relates to crimes of criminal assocation, Mafia association
30 Generally speaking, PCA is a statistical technique that is used for data reduction. It is appropriate
when one has data on a number of variables that are correlated with each other (possibly because they are
measuring the same phenomena), in which case one can reduce the number of these observable variables
into a smaller number of artificial variables (the principal components) that account for most of the variation
in the observables.
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and Mafia homicides. Column 2 extends this to include bomb attacks, whilst Column
3 makes a further extension to include extortion (corresponding to our baseline OC
Index 5). Column 4 adds arson to the list of offences and excludes criminal association
and extortion, and Column 6 refers to the list of offences suggested by ISTAT. In each
and every case, our main results are unchanged.
7 Conclusion
This paper has sought to cast further light on the growth implications of organized
crime and its interaction with corruption. The adverse effects of these two phenomena
on growth and development are well-documented, and the fight against each of them
remains high on the agendas of national and international agencies. What is less well-
understood is the extent to which their impacts might be reinforced or subdued through
linkages between them. The mechanics of this ambiguity have been documented in
a companion paper, by BNR, and briefly summarized in this study. In this paper, our
primary objective is to take the analysis further in an effort to resolve this ambiguity.
We do this by investigating empirically whether organized crime distorts economic
growth by a different degree when acting alone compared to when co-existing with
corruption. The long and strong presence of both these illicit activities in Italy, make
this country a natural choice to apply our examination.
BNR show how organized crime alone creates an unfavorable climate for business
activity by raising the costs of this activity through extortion. The upshot is that growth
is lower than would otherwise be the case. This is what one would expect, but the study
further demonstrates how the impact of organized crime may be conditional on the
presence of corruption. Results indicate that this conditionality could go either way—
organized crime may be more or less damaging if it co-exists with corruption. The
intuition is that since corruption operates as a tax on criminality, the outcome depends
on the expected payoffs of the crime syndicate when having to pay bribes to corrupt law
officers. This, in turn, depends on the trade-off between a lower supply of crimes and
the probability these crimes are more likely to be successful. If corruption, despite its
direct cost to criminals, leads to higher (lower) expected payoff from extortion, then the
growth-diminishing effect of crime is greater (smaller) in the presence of corruption.
Building on the inconclusive theoretical forecast of our companion study, the empir-
ical analysis in this paper provides clear evidence that resolves the above ambiguity
with reference to Italy. The key aspect of our empirical specification is the inclusion
of an interaction term between organized crime and corruption in our growth regres-
sions. Using different methodologies and datasets, we find that both organized crime
and corruption have a negative effect on economic growth, while the coefficient on
their interaction term is consistently positive and statistically significant. The impli-
cation is that organized crime is less damaging to growth in the presence, rather than
the absence, of corruption. This provides strong support in favor of one of the two
possible, and plausible, theoretical predictions alluded to earlier. At the same time,
our finding highlights the importance of treating jointly the two illegal phenomena of
organized crime and corruption in the context of growth analysis.
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Data appendix
See Table 7.
Table 7 Description of variables and sources
Variables Description Sources
GDP growth pc Log difference of GDP per capita
in thousands of millions of lire
(constant 1990 prices)
ISTAT-Annals of Statistics and
CRENoS-1961/2009
Initial GDP pc (log) Log of initial GDP per capita in
thousands of millions of lire
(constant 1990 prices)
ISTAT-Annals of Statistics and
CRENoS-1961/2009
Investment Share of gross private investment
(% of GDP)
ISTAT-Annals of Statistics and
CRENoS-1961/2009
Education Percentage of population in age
range 14–18 registered in high
school
ISTAT-Annals of Statistics and
CRENoS-1961/2009
Inflation GDP deflator ISTAT-Annals of Statistics and
CRENoS-1961/2009
Population growth Population growth rate ISTAT-Annals of
Statistics-1961/2009
Public spending Share of total public spending (%
of GDP)
ISTAT-Annals of
Statistics-1961/2009
Trade Share of trade (% of GDP) ISTAT-Annals of
Statistics-1961/2009
Financial development Share of value added of financial
and banking sector (% of GDP)
ISTAT-Annals of Statistics and
CRENoS-1975/2009
Corruption Number of crimes against Public
Administration (PA) based on
Statues no. 286 through 294.
Excluding crimes against PA
that do not involve corruption
such as Statute 279 (insulting a
public officer) and Statute 295
(neglect or refusal of an official
duty) reported to the police, per
100,000 inhabitants. These
crimes include embezzlement
and misallocation of public
funds
ISTAT-Annals of Judicial
Statistics-1961/2009
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Table 7 continued
Variables Description Sources
OC Index 5 Sum of the following crimes:
Mafia criminal association,
homicides by Mafia, criminal
association, bomb attacks,
extortion (per 100,000
inhabitants)
ISTAT-Annals of Judicial
Statistics-1983/2009
Extortion Number of crimes of extortion
denounced (per 100,000
inhabitants)
ISTAT-Annals of Judicial
Statistics-1975/2009
Criminal Association
(art.416)
Number of crimes of criminal
association (per 100,000
inhabitants) defined as: “the
association of three or more
people who are organized in
order to commit a plurality of
crimes”
ISTAT-Annals of Judicial
Statistics-1975/2009
Mafia Criminal Association
(art.416 bis)
Number of crimes of Mafia
criminal association (per
100,000 inhabitants) defined
as:“the association is of the
Mafia type when its components
use intimidation, awe and
silence in order to commit
crimes, to acquire the control
or the management of business
activities (i.e., concessions,
permissions, public contracts
or other public services), to
derive profit or advantages for
themselves or others, to limit
the freedom of exerting the
right to vote, and to find votes
for themselves or others during
the electoral campaign.”
ISTAT-Annals of Judicial
Statistics-1983/2009
Homicides by Mafia Number of homicides by mafia
(per 100,000 inhabitants)
ISTAT-Annals of Judicial
Statistics-1975/2009
Bomb attacks Number of bomb attacks (per
100,000 inhabitants)
ISTAT-Annals of Judicial
Statistics-1983/2009
Arsons Number of arsons (per 100,000
inhabitants)
ISTAT-Annals of Judicial
Statistics-1975/2009
Robberies in Banks Number of robberies in banks
(per 100,000 inhabitants)
ISTAT-Annals of Judicial
Statistics-1975/2009
Robberies in Post Offices Number of robberies in post
offices (per 100,000
inhabitants)
ISTAT-Annals of Judicial
Statistics-1975/2010
Kidnapping for extortion Number of kidnapping for
extortion (per 100,000
inhabitants)
ISTAT-Annals of Judicial
Statistics-1975/2011
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Table 7 continued
Variables Description Sources
OC Index ISTAT Sum of the following crimes:
homicides by Mafia, bomb
attacks, arsons, serious
robberies (in banks and post
offices) per 100,000 inhabitants
ISTAT-Annals of Judicial
Statistics-1983/2009
OC Index CRENOS Sum of the following crimes:
extortion, kidnapping for
extortion, serious robberies (in
banks and post offices) per
100,000 inhabitants
ISTAT-Annals of Statistics and
CRENoS-1961/2009
OC Index Daniele–Marani Sum of the following crimes:
extortion, bomb attacks, arsons,
criminal association, Mafia
criminal association (per
100,000 inhabitants)
ISTAT-Annals of Judicial
Statistics-1983/2009
Homicides Number of intentional homicides
(per 100,000 inhabitants)
ISTAT-Annals of Judicial
Statistics-1960/2010
PCA OC Index 5 Principal Component Analysis of
the crimes included in OC
Index 5
ISTAT-Annals of Judicial
Statistics-1983/2009
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